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Trait anxiety is associated with deficits in attentional control, particularly in the ability to
inhibit prepotent responses. Here, we investigated this effect while varying the level of
cognitive load in a modified antisaccade task that employed emotional facial expressions
(neutral, happy, and angry) as targets. Load was manipulated using a secondary auditory
task requiring recognition of tones (low load), or recognition of specific tone pitch (high
load). Results showed that load increased antisaccade latencies on trials where gaze
toward face stimuli should be inhibited. This effect was exacerbated for high anxious
individuals. Emotional expression also modulated task performance on antisaccade trials
for both high and low anxious participants under low cognitive load, but did not influence
performance under high load. Collectively, results (1) suggest that individuals reporting
high levels of anxiety are particularly vulnerable to the effects of cognitive load on
inhibition, and (2) support recent evidence that loading cognitive processes can reduce
emotional influences on attention and cognition.
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INTRODUCTION
Efficient goal-directed behavior depends upon top-down atten-
tional control, allowing goal-relevant information to be attended
to rather than irrelevant information. However, the efficiency
with which we employ attentional control depends upon a combi-
nation of both internal factors, one’s inherent attentional control
abilities, and external factors, the amount a task or goal taxes our
attentional control abilities in order to accomplish. One inter-
nal factor that has been shown to affect attentional control is
an individual’s self-reported level of trait anxiety (Eysenck and
Derakshan, 2011).
It has been well-documented that trait anxious individuals
show a bias in their selective attention toward irrelevant threat-
laden information, with a meta-analysis finding consistent evi-
dence of such a bias (Bar-Haim et al., 2007). For example, dot
probe paradigms demonstrate that highly anxious individuals
show markedly increased latency costs when ignoring threat-
ening stimuli and responding to a target at a different spatial
location (e.g., Arndt and Fujiwara, 2012). Such biases could be
argued to be hardwired, even extending to individual differences
in amygdala response to subliminal threat items (Etkin et al.,
2004).
Based on this evidence, one potential conclusion is that anxiety
does not affect attentional control in general, but selectively biases
attentional control in response to the presentation of threatening
stimuli. A growing body of work, however, has highlighted that
anxious individuals also show impaired attentional control in sit-
uations where threat is absent. For example, trait anxious individ-
uals show greater costs on latency performance in the antisaccade
task (Derakshan et al., 2009; Ansari and Derakshan, 2011b) and
increased response-competition in flanker tasks (Bishop, 2009;
Pacheco-Unguetti et al., 2010). These findings can be accommo-
dated within Attentional Control Theory (ACT; Eysenck et al.,
2007), which posits that trait anxiety disrupts the three key facets
of attentional control: inhibition of task-irrelevant information,
flexibly shifting attention, and updating representations in work-
ing memory. Accumulating behavioral, electrophysiological, and
neuroimaging evidence supports these predictions in recent years
(see Eysenck and Derakshan, 2011; Berggren and Derakshan,
2013, for reviews).
According to ACT the effects of anxiety on attentional con-
trol should be greater under competing task demands. Indeed, it
has been well-documented that the level of external task demands
can strongly influence attentional control. This has most com-
monly been manipulated through varying cognitive demands
on working memory during study via a secondary task such as
item rehearsal. Such a manipulation is believed to tax executive
resources, required for maintaining task goals and prioritiz-
ing task-relevant over irrelevant information (Baddeley, 1986).
Loading working memory increases response latencies and error
rates in the antisaccade task (Roberts et al., 1994; Kane et al.,
2001; Berggren et al., 2011), and increases task-irrelevant interfer-
ence by both response-competing and wholly irrelevant distractor
items (de Fockert et al., 2001; Lavie et al., 2004; Lavie and De
Fockert, 2005). Distractor interference also increases under load
acrossmodalities, impacting processing in the auditory and tactile
domains (Dalton et al., 2009a,b). In particular, de Fockert et al.
(2001) showed that loading working memory increased activity
in the visual cortex, for face distractors in the fusiform “face”
area, suggesting that attentional selection and control are strongly
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influenced by the availability of working memory resources.
Finally, the ability to inhibit distractor items, measured by neg-
ative priming for distractors that subsequently become targets, is
eliminated when cognitive processes are taxed by load (de Fockert
et al., 2010).
A number of studies have investigated whether cognitive load
may particularly hamper attentional control in anxious individ-
uals, disrupting task performance. These studies can be roughly
divided into two subsets: those investigating the effect of cognitive
load on distraction in the presence of task-irrelevant emotional
material, and those assessing effects on distraction in the absence
of emotional stimuli. For the former, evidence has been incon-
sistent. Studies examining fear-potentiated startle reflex have
suggested that enhanced distraction in anxiety is reduced under
cognitive load (Dvorak-Bertsch et al., 2007; Vytal et al., 2012),
investigations examining the late positive potential (LPP; asso-
ciated with emotional arousal) have implied smaller reductions
under load in anxious individuals (MacNamara et al., 2011),
and studies measuring distraction by emotional faces have found
increased vigilance in anxiety under load (Ladouceur et al., 2009;
Judah et al., 2013). However, these effects may be confounded by
the influence of cognitive load on emotion processing in general.
While non-emotional distraction appears to increase under cog-
nitive load, as outlined above, emotional distraction appears to
generally be reduced as indexed by emotional startle (King and
Schaefer, 2011), LPP (MacNamara et al., 2011; Van Dillen and
Derks, 2012) and RT distraction (Van Dillen and Koole, 2009).
Thus, reductions in anxious threat biases may reflect a more
general impact of cognitive load on emotion processing.
Further insight into how cognitive load affects attentional
control in anxiety was obtained by Berggren et al. (2012) who
employed a visual search paradigm where participants responded
to a target face of a different emotional expression to a crowd (e.g.,
a neutral face among a crowd of happy faces). Cognitive load was
induced by participants simultaneously counting back in threes
from a specified number at the start of each trial. Low and high
anxious participants did not differ in their performance under
no-load, but while low anxious participants showed no perfor-
mance cost with the introduction of counting, the high anxious
participants were significantly slower. This suggested that cog-
nitive load had a more potent effect on individuals with high
anxiety, and notably this effect occurred regardless of the emo-
tional content of distractor faces. However, this visual search
paradigm contained no direct form of distraction; displays con-
tained a target with a number of non-target items, but these
additional stimuli could not be directly examined for the extent
to which they impeded task performance. Thus, one could argue
that group differences under cognitive load may simply be due
to a general slowing of reaction time not indicative of hampered
inhibitory control per se. In other words, anxious individuals
may simply have demonstrated performance costs due to task
demands rather than any effect on attentional control aspects of
inhibition.
In the present study, we aimed to build upon previous work
using a task containing task-irrelevant information and requiring
cognitive inhibition, thus enabling a clearer test for the predic-
tion that cognitive load should disrupt attentional control to a
greater extent in high anxious individuals. We utilized the anti-
saccade task where participants are required to shift their overt
attention toward or away from an abrupt visual onset, the lat-
ter process requiring cognitive inhibition to suppress a reflexive
occulomotor response (Ettinger et al., 2008). Both anxiety and
cognitive load have been previously shown to increase latencies on
“look away” antisaccade trials (Derakshan et al., 2009; Berggren
et al., 2011), while having no effect on “look at” prosaccade tri-
als that require no inhibitory processing. Thus, the current study
disentangled the possibility that load increases response laten-
cies, as effects should be confined to antisaccade trials weighting
on attentional control. We manipulated load using a previously
demonstrated method (Berggren et al., 2011); participants heard
three kinds of auditory tones while completing the antisaccade
task, and responded simply with the word “tone” on low load tri-
als or the words “high,” “mid,” or “low” depending on the tone’s
pitch in high load. We hypothesized that load should increase
antisaccade eye-movement latencies, while having no effect on
reflexive prosaccade latencies. In addition, based onACT’s predic-
tions, we hypothesized that the load cost on antisaccades would be
exacerbated for individuals reporting high levels of trait anxiety.
Finally, we also manipulated the emotional valence of visual
onsets signaling participants to make an eye-movement saccade
in the antisaccade task, using facial stimuli of different expressions
(neutral, happy, and angry). We aimed to further explore whether
distraction from emotional faces would be reduced under cogni-
tive load as suggested in previous work, particularly for threaten-
ing angry/fearful stimuli (e.g., King and Schaefer, 2011). We also
examined how this effect could be modulated by trait anxiety lev-
els, in light of the wealth of literature that anxiety should enhance
distraction by threat-related content as well as distraction by
non-emotional information generally.
METHOD
PARTICIPANTS
Ninety-four participants (29males; mean age= 29 years, SD = 6)
were recruited via advertisements posted in University of London
departments. All participants had normal hearing, normal or
corrected-to-normal vision, and were naïve to the experimental
hypotheses.
APPARATUS, MATERIALS, AND STIMULI
An SR Research Eyelink 1000 eye-tracker (SR Research, ON,
Canada) was used to record eye-movements, tracking one eye.
Nine-point calibration ensured that tracking accuracy was within
1◦ of visual angle. Stimuli were presented on a 21 inch Viewsonic
CRT monitor (140Hz), and viewing distance was held constant
at 60 cm using a chinrest. The experiment was created using the
SR Research Experiment Builder software. A laptop played audi-
tory tones separately during blocks, presented in a randomized
order using E-Prime software (Schneider et al., 2002). Face stim-
uli of neutral, angry and happy expressions were selected from
the NimStim Face Stimulus Set (Tottenham et al., 2009) and the
Ekman series (Ekman and Friesen, 1976). Six separate identities
were used in total, with a 1:1 gender ratio. All face images were
cropped and modified to only show the face and appear in black
and white. For saccade recording, an amplitude of 2◦ each side of
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fixation was used as saccade boundaries; eye-movements crossing
either boundary were recorded for latency and accuracy.
PROCEDURE
The study was approved by the departmental ethics committee.
The experiment was conducted within a sound-protected room.
After providing consent, participants completed the State-Trait
Anxiety Inventory1 (STAI; Spielberger et al., 1983), a reliable mea-
sure of self-report trait anxiety level through the sum of scaled
multiple choice responses (Spielberger et al., 1995), before being
given the experimental instructions. Each trial began with a fix-
ation cross (approximately 0.67× 0.67◦ of visual angle) in the
center of the screen appearing for up to 1000ms. Participants
were instructed to fixate this cross and, once they had fixated
between 500 and 1000ms after its onset, the trial moved forward
immediately acting as a drift correct to tracking. Following this,
face stimuli subtending approximately 3.44× 5.25◦ appeared in
the left or right periphery (at an eccentricity of approximately
11.23◦ from stimulus center to fixation) for 600ms. At the start of
each block participants were signaled how they should respond to
the stimuli; in prosaccade blocks, participants were asked to move
their eyes and fixate the face stimuli as quickly and as accurately
as possible. In antisaccade blocks, participants were told to move
their eyes away from the face stimuli to the mirror location in
the other periphery as quickly and as accurately as possible. It was
also emphasized that on antisaccade trials, participants should try
their best to avoid looking at the face stimuli. A 1500ms inter-trial
interval was used (see Figure 1 for details).
Auditory tones played via a laptop provided the secondary
load manipulation. In high load blocks, participants heard three
differently-pitched tones presented every 1900–2300ms (at any
possible increments of 100ms). Participants verbally responded
to whether the pitch of the tone was “low,” “mid,” or “high” while
continuing to complete the anti/prosaccade task. In low load
blocks, participants only ever heard the middle pitched tone, and
were simply required to respond by saying the word “tone” when-
ever they heard one. Participants were told to respond promptly
and accurately to the tones, and the experimenter monitored their
performance, giving feedback at the end of blocks if errors had
been made.
There were thus four different blocked conditions, prosac-
cade/antisaccade with low/high cognitive load. Facial expression
of visual onsets in the task was presented randomly within
blocks and each expression appeared on an equal number of
trials. Participants were given initial practice at discriminating
the auditory tones, and subsequently 16 practice trials in the
antisaccade/prosaccade task. Participants then completed eight
blocks of 36 trials, with block order following an ABCDDCBA
format (condition to letter counterbalanced across participants).
Participants were then thanked and debriefed.
1The STAI has high internal consistency in measuring trait anxiety. In the
present study, the spread of anxiety scores is consistent with previous work,
where medians tend to sit around a score of 37 (Fox et al., 2002). Furthermore,
as illustrated in Figure 2, we had an adequate proportion of scorers below 35
and above 40, suggested to be appropriate cut-offs to reflect clear low and
highly anxious individuals (Fox et al., 2002).
FIGURE 1 | Example trial display (not to scale). (A) Following fixation, a
face image appeared either in the left or right periphery, displaying either a
neutral, angry, or happy emotional expression. Depending on the block
type, participants were asked to move their eyes from fixation to the image
as quickly as possible, or look away from the image and move their eyes to
the opposite end of the screen. (B) In addition to eye movements,
participants simultaneously responded verbally to tones played during
blocks. Under low load, participants always heard a mid-pitched tone, and
responded by saying “tone” each time they heard a sound. (C) Under high
load, tones were presented at three different pitches, and participants
responded to this with “low,” “mid,” or “high” when a tone played. All
tones played randomly every 1900–2300ms.
RESULTS
WITHIN-SUBJECTS EFFECTS
Data from 10 participants were removed due to overall antisac-
cade errors of over 50%. Anticipatory saccade (eye movements
quicker than 85ms; M = 1.74% of data) and no recorded sac-
cade trials (M = 1.65% of data) were also removed from the data
prior to error rate analysis.
Saccade latencies
Correct response latencies from 84 participants were entered
into a three-way ANOVA with the factors expression (neutral,
angry, happy), load (low, high), and condition (antisaccade,
prosaccade). Descriptive statistics are shown in Table 1. Analysis
showed a main effect of load [F(1, 83) = 24.52, p < 0.001], indi-
cating slower saccade latencies under high load (M = 251ms,
SD = 29) vs. low load (M = 243ms, SD = 33). A main effect
of condition [F(1, 83) = 495.74, p < 0.001] also demonstrated
faster latencies on prosaccade (M = 200ms, SD = 30) compared
with antisaccade trials (M = 294ms, SD = 40). Importantly, a
two-way interaction of load × condition [F(1, 83) = 18.54, p <
0.001] revealed that load increased latencies on antisaccade tri-
als [M = 286–302ms; t(83) = 6.36, p < 0.001], but did not affect
prosaccade speed (M = 200–201ms; t < 1).
There was no main effect of expression, or an interaction of
expression × condition (F’s < 1). However, there was both a
significant two-way interaction of expression × load [F(2, 166) =
5.25, p < 0.01], and a Three-Way interaction of expression ×
load × condition [F(2, 166) = 3.68, p < 0.03]. To decompose
these effects, separate ANOVAs were firstly conducted within each
level of the condition factor. For prosaccades, there was no main
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effect of expression (F’s < 1), and no two-way interaction with
load [F(2, 166) = 1.45, p = 0.24]. On antisaccade trials, there was
no main effect of expression (F < 1), but a significant interac-
tion with load did emerge [F(2, 166) = 5.74, p < 0.01]. One-Way
ANOVAs showed no significant effect of expression under high
load [F(2, 166) = 1.14, p = 0.32], but a significant effect under low
load [F(2, 166) = 5.91, p < 0.01]. As reflected in Table 1, latencies
were fastest in response to happy expressions and slowest for
angry, corresponding to a strong linear contrast [F(1, 83) = 11.6,
p = 0.001]. Pairwise comparisons showed a significant differ-
ence between angry and happy expressions [t(83) = 3.41, p =
0.001], neutral vs. happy differences were just short of significance
[t(83) = 1.98, p = 0.05]. However, neutral and angry expressions
did not differ [t(83) = 1.44, p = 0.15].
Error rates
There was a main effect of condition [F(1, 83) = 150.45, p <
0.001], reflecting higher errors on antisaccade trials (M = 18%,
SD = 11) compared to prosaccade (M = 5%, SD = 6). There
was also a main effect of load [F(1, 83) = 8.14, p < 0.01]
indicating modest but significantly higher errors under high
load (M = 12%, SD = 8) compared with low load (M =
11%, SD = 9). Furthermore, a significant two-way interac-
tion of load × condition [F(1, 83) = 8.56, p < 0.01] mir-
rored latency data by showing increased errors under high
compared to low load on antisaccade trials [M = 16–20%;
t(83) = 3.40, p = 0.001], but no effect on prosaccade trials
(M = 5–5%; t < 1).
There was no main effect of expression or interaction with
load (F’s< 1), or condition [F(2, 166) = 1.13, p = 0.33]. However,
a Three-Way interaction of expression × load × condition was
observed [F(2, 166) = 5.77, p < 0.01]. Separate ANOVAs within
each level of condition factor showed a trend under prosaccade
trials for a main effect of expression [F(2, 166) = 2.42, p = 0.09],
and for an interaction of expression × load [F(2, 166) = 2.71,
p = 0.07]. On antisaccade trials, there was no main effect of
expression (F < 1) but a significant expression × load inter-
action [F(2, 166) = 3.17, p < 0.05]. While there was no effect
of expression under high load (F < 1), an effect in low load
was seen [F(2, 166) = 3.74, p < 0.03]. Similar to response laten-
cies, Table 1 shows the lowest errors on happy expression trials,
Table 1 | Mean saccadic latencies (milliseconds) and percentage error
rates within expression, load, and condition factors (standard
deviation of the mean in parentheses).
Expression Level of load and condition
Low load High load
Antisaccade Prosaccade Antisaccade Prosaccade
Neutral 286 (45) 199 (34) 302 (42) 202 (35)
16 (14) 5 (7) 20 (14) 4 (7)
Angry 290 (49) 202 (38) 299 (46) 201 (34)
18 (13) 5 (7) 19 (13) 6 (9)
Happy 281 (43) 200 (35) 305 (48) 200 (31)
15 (13) 6 (8) 20 (14) 5 (8)
with the highest on angry expression trials, reflected by a strong
linear contrast [F(1, 83) = 9.09, p < 0.01]. Pairwise comparisons
showed that errors on angry and happy expression trials sig-
nificantly differed [t(83) = 3.02, p < 0.01]. Differences between
neutral and angry expression trials did not reach significance
[t(83) = 1.70, p = 0.09], and nor did neutral vs. happy expression
trial error rates [t(83) = 1.02, p = 0.31].
EFFECTS OF INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES IN TRAIT ANXIETY
Saccade latencies
Trait anxiety scores varied across participants (Med = 39, SD =
11, range = 20–69). As occulomotor speed differs between
individuals, we subtracted prosaccade latencies from antisaccade
for each participant, creating a measure of cost to saccade speed
on trials requiring a controlled eye-movement vs. a baseline
reflexive response. Using trait anxiety score as a continuous
measure, we then correlated this with inhibitory cost from the
low and high load conditions. Under low load, there was no
significant correlation between trait anxiety score and inhibitory
costs (r = 0.105, N = 84, p = 0.34). However, anxiety was asso-
ciated with inhibitory costs under high load (r = 0.244, N = 84,
p < 0.03). Furthermore, when subtracting the inhibitory cost
under low load from high to reveal the extent of load in disrupt-
ing inhibition, a positive correlation with anxiety again emerged
(r = 0.182, N = 84, p < 0.05 one-tailed; see Figure 2). Thus,
anxiety was associated with the magnitude of cost on inhibition
under cognitive load.
To assess whether the effect of anxiety and inhibition was
modulated by the emotional expression of the visual onset,
we conducted further correlational analyses with anxiety and
inhibitory costs for each expression under each level of load.
Under low load, anxiety did not correlate with inhibitory
costs on neutral (r = 0.150, N = 84, p = 0.17) or either emo-
tional expression level (r’s < 1). Under high load, evidence
of a positive correlation between inhibitory costs and anxi-
ety was observed regardless of expression being neutral (r =
0.269, N = 84, p = 0.01), angry (r = 0.186, N = 84, p = 0.05
one-tailed), or happy (r = 0.179, N = 84, p = 0.05 one-tailed).
Modulations by anxiety therefore appeared to occur regardless of
stimulus emotion.
FIGURE 2 | Correlation between trait anxiety score and load-induced
inhibitory costs on saccadic eye-movements.
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Error rates
Anxiety score did not correlate with inhibitory cost error rates
under either level of load (r’s < 1), and did not correlate with
the load cost (r = −0.107, N = 84, p = 0.33). Likewise, there
was no evidence of anxiety associated with inhibitory costs for
different emotional expressions at any load level (all r’s < 0.148,
p’s > 0.18).
DISCUSSION
Results from the present study suggest that increasing cognitive
load not only disrupts attentional control processes, but this effect
is especially potent for individuals with high levels of trait anxi-
ety. Furthermore, results show an effect of emotional valence by
load, in that evidence of emotion modulating task performance
was evident on antisaccade trials only under low load; high load
eliminated all emotional expression differences.
ATTENTIONAL CONTROL IN TRAIT ANXIETY UNDER COGNITIVE LOAD
Deficits in attentional control in trait anxiety, particularly on
the subcomponent of cognitive inhibition, have been suggested
in a number of previous investigations examining covert (e.g.,
Pacheco-Unguetti et al., 2010) and overt (e.g., Derakshan et al.,
2009) attention, with additional electrophysiological and neu-
roimaging studies suggesting individual differences in the pre-
frontal attentional control network (Bishop, 2009; Ansari and
Derakshan, 2011a). However, ACT’s prediction that the cognitive
demands in a task should hamper performance to a greater extent
in individuals with pre-existing deficits in attentional control has
to date received far less empirical support. Previous evidence for
this theory has primarily come from language-based experiments,
where anxious individuals perform worse under more difficult
test conditions (Calvo, 1985; Calvo et al., 1992) or when cognitive
load is manipulated through digit rehearsal of increasing diffi-
culty (MacLeod and Donnellan, 1993; Derakshan and Eysenck,
1998; Wood et al., 2001) during tasks that assess grammatical rea-
soning. However, as with a recent study by Berggren et al. (2012),
described in our Introduction, these studies cannot clearly show
that attentional control in anxiety was further disrupted by load,
as increased costs could be due to general issues in performance
and not attributable to attentional control per se. The present
study rules out this possibility; anxious individuals did not per-
form worse on prosaccade trials under load, where no element
of inhibition is required to be efficient in the task. On the other
hand, performance on antisaccade trials requiring inhibitory con-
trol to suppress a reflexive eye-movement was impaired under
load, and the extent of this impairment directly correlated with
participants’ anxiety levels.
While the present study argues that anxious individuals should
exercise poorer attentional control as a task’s difficulty increases,
it is worthy to address claims that the opposite may be the case.
For example, Bishop (2009) showed that increasing perceptual
task demands eliminated task-irrelevant distraction and indi-
vidual differences in anxiety modulated distraction under low
perceptual load. While this effect can be attributed to perceptual
load reducing basic perception of distractors (see Berggren and
Derakshan, 2013, for comment), it was noted that attentional
focus could play a role in the effect of anxiety on attentional
control. In other words, under low attentional demands, anx-
ious individuals may be more distracted but this effect wanes
as more demanding tasks prompt focused attention. Similarly, it
has been suggested that working memory capacity/span relates to
attentional control abilities. While there have been many demon-
strations of attentional control being disrupted by taxing working
memory, it has also been documented that individuals with
low working memory span are less susceptible to cognitive load
manipulations (Kane and Engle, 2000).
One explanation for this finding is that anxious individu-
als already have impaired attentional control abilities, and using
a load to tax inhibitory ability would have a reduced effect
when baseline ability is already nearer floor. Importantly, in the
present study, inhibitory ability between groups did not differ
under low cognitive load; rather than group differences atten-
uating, they emerged as cognitive load was raised. Therefore,
it is possible that attention focus in anxious individuals was
enhanced in light of increased task demands but that high cogni-
tive load taxed attentional control and counteracted this process.
Whether or not factors such as motivation can impact atten-
tional control deficits in low cognitively demanding tasks is
a theoretically important question for future research. Indeed,
according to one of the major predictions of ACT, motivation
may play a key role in attentional control deficits in anxiety,
with poor performance under low motivation and improved
performance when encouraged (see Berggren and Derakshan,
2013).
EMOTION PROCESSING UNDER COGNITIVE LOAD
Results from the present study also showed that cognitive load
affected emotion processing. Under low load, emotional expres-
sion modulated both latencies and error rates, and this effect
was confined to the antisaccade condition rather than prosac-
cade. As prosaccade performance is mainly reflexive, it is likely
that the absence of an effect of emotional expression in this
condition reflects latency speed being at ceiling. In the antisac-
cade condition, where participants should inhibit the reflexive
eye-movement, there is greater scope for differences to emerge.
Notably, such valence differences only occurred under low load;
high load both slowed antisaccade latencies and eliminated dif-
ferences between valence conditions. This finding is unlikely to
be due to converse floor effects on latencies with the imposition of
load, considering that individual differences in anxiety influenced
performance under high load.
Our findings with emotion and cognitive load mirror that
of a number of previous studies that have primarily examined
interactions of load with negative emotions. Van Dillen and
Koole (2009) found that angry, compared to happy, distractors
slowed reaction times under low load, but did not differ under
high load. Emotional startle effects from threatening images has
also been shown to be reduced under cognitive load, as has
LPP amplitude reflecting emotional arousal (e.g., MacNamara
et al., 2011). Even neural activity in the amygdala, seen as a
clear index of the processing of negative emotion, has been
suggested to show weaker response to emotion under cognitive
load or distraction techniques (Van Dillen et al., 2009; McRae
et al., 2010). Collectively, these results support the view that the
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processing of emotional information may share resources with
other cognitive processes (e.g., Pessoa, 2010).
However, the effects by emotion observed in the present study
did not appear solely driven by the threat value of angry expres-
sions. Differences between happy and angry expression trials were
seen for both response latencies and error rates, but comparison
with neutral expression trials acting as a baseline did not differ
from the other emotional conditions significantly for latencies
or error rates. Consequently, the present study supports the view
that cognitive load can reduce the impact of emotional stimuli on
cognitive processes such as inhibitory control, but cannot clarify
whether low load effects were predominantly caused by nega-
tive emotion impairing performance or perhaps positive emotion
facilitating it. While there is ample evidence that positive emo-
tional stimuli are also prioritized for attention (e.g., Williams
et al., 2005), we avoid speculation given that the locus of emotion
modulations are unclear here; our hypothesis was concerned with
whether cognitive load would attenuate emotional influences on
inhibitory control, which was supported.
Finally, we did not observe any differential biases toward threat
in anxiety under low cognitive load, despite a wealth of previ-
ous literature supporting such a bias for highly anxious groups
(see Bar-Haim et al., 2007). A similar finding was also obtained
in Berggren et al. (2012) where anxiety led to performance costs
under cognitive load but did not adversely affect emotion pro-
cessing in general. One probable explanation for this result is that
threat biases overall were weak when making comparisons with
neutral expression trials. In other words, effects by anxiety may
not have been evident due to the threat value of angry stimuli
not being sufficiently high enough in this experimental context to
elicit biases for high anxious participants. Thus, it remains unan-
swered here how inhibitory control of irrelevant threat stimuli in
anxiety is affected by loading cognitive processes.
FUTURE DIRECTIONS
While the present study establishes clear evidence that trait anx-
iety results in poor attentional control under high cognitive
demands, a number of avenues for future research remain. Firstly,
previous studies examining attention to threat in anxiety under
cognitive load have found conflicting results, with some indica-
tion of enhanced threat processing (Ladouceur et al., 2009; Judah
et al., 2013), smaller reductions in LPP arousal responses in anxi-
ety (MacNamara et al., 2011), but also reduced emotional startle
for high anxious participants under load (Dvorak-Bertsch et al.,
2007; Vytal et al., 2012). It is noteworthy that these studies can be
separated reasonably well in relation to their measure of anxiety;
increased threat biases seem to occur when trait anxiety is exam-
ined (Ladouceur et al., 2009; Judah et al., 2013), while reduced
emotional effects seem to dovetail studies where anxiety has been
induced in participants (Dvorak-Bertsch et al., 2007; Vytal et al.,
2012; but see MacNamara et al., 2011).
Both trait anxiety and mood induction of state anxiety, such
as through threat of shock, have been shown to have similar
effects on distractibility in some contexts such as the antisac-
cade task (Cornwell et al., 2012), but may do so through different
means. For example, Pacheco-Unguetti et al. (2010) found that
trait anxiety reduces executive control of attention while state
anxiety modulates the alerting and orienting functions. Thus, the
effect of cognitive load may differ in that it exacerbates behav-
ioral effects for trait anxious participants while alleviating effects
of state mood. Indeed, it is a possibility that cognitive load
could attenuate the priming aspect of a mood induction, while
having little effect on fundamental neural differences associated
with a trait anxious personality. Future research should examine
whether cognitive load can be a beneficial therapy intervention in
reducing unwanted emotional experience, as proposed by some
(e.g., Van Dillen et al., 2009), or whether it can conversely be
detrimental to emotion regulation. The type of anxiety experi-
enced, whether trait or state, could be a crucial factor in this
regard. This is particularly important to clarify considering that
trait anxiety is a major vulnerability factor in the development of
pathological anxiety disorders.
Secondly, future research may further examine how cognitive
load impairs more general attentional control in anxiety. Here,
we have suggested that anxiety exacerbates cognitive load effects
on attention, but it remains unclear how this influences across
tasks. As we did not record accuracy for our secondary auditory
task, it is possible that cognitive load may have impaired perfor-
mance on both tasks, further compromising attentional control in
anxiety. Furthermore, individual differences in response to emo-
tional stimuli may have been evident on the secondary load task,
with anxious participants prioritizing the saccade task in such
instances and reducing accuracy and/or response times to the
tones. Further work should examine how high anxious individ-
uals coordinate their resources under dual task conditions, as well
as the effect of divided attention paradigms. This would also pro-
vide more insight into the underlying neural mechanisms behind
the present results; previous work has highlighted that anxiety
modulates areas associated with attentional control such as dor-
solateral prefrontal cortex (Bishop, 2009; Basten et al., 2011), and
cognitive load has been shown to increase visual representations
for distractor information (e.g., de Fockert et al., 2001). On this
basis, the ability to suppress distractor representations under load
may have been more strongly impaired in anxious individuals.
How cognitive load effects may translate in anxiety under dual
task conditions requiring more internal suppression of task goals
when switching between tasks remains an open question.
CONCLUSION
The present study suggests that increasing cognitive load disrupts
performance in tasks requiring attentional control, particularly
for individuals reporting high levels of trait anxiety. This sup-
ports ACT’s prediction that increasing task demand causes greater
attentional control decrements in high anxiety, pointing to a
poorer ability to maintain task goals when pre-existing deficits in
attentional control are further compromised. Finally, results also
suggest reduced threat biases in attention under cognitive load,
supporting accounts of shared emotion-cognition resources.
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